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15. REFLECTIONS ON THE PLANNING
CONTRIBUTION PROPOSALS
General comments
Notwithstanding the opposition to the proposed
planning contribution clauses both in the House of
Commons and the House of Lords and calls for them to be
deleted, the general thrust of the planning contributions
clauses (cls 46, 47 and 48) did not change substantively
during the passage of the Bill through Parliament save for
clause 47 (the Regulations), where at the House of Lords
Third Reading debate on 25 March 2004, Lord Bassam
moved an amendment to recreate the existing offence of
section 106(8) making it an offence to obstruct the
enforcement of a planning obligation. He thought that this
should be specifically included within the Act rather than
in regulations and suggested an amendment to clause 47(6)
accordingly.
The Government have displayed a dogged determination
to seize the opportunity to legislate on the vexed area of
planning contributions. It seems extraordinary that the
Government should have seen fit to reintroduce a form of
tariff so soon after ditching the concept.
It is even more extraordinary that the Government,
having decided to introduce the optional charge, has
brought forward the proposals in skeleton format without
any real idea how the system will work in practice. What
they should have done was to have commissioned the task
force at the outset to look into the feasibility of setting an
optional charge. They could have had a pilot study and
come up with findings. The Government could then have
come up with a suggested detailed system on which it
could have sought views by way of a consultation exercise.
It is also extraordinary that the Government decided to
introduce the planning contribution clauses at the very
time that Kate Barker was producing her initial report
including comments on the planning system and the role of
planning obligations. Now that we have Kate Barker’s
suggestion of the planning gain supplement and her
comments that the optional planning charge is very much
second best, the Government is still ploughing on with its
proposals for the optional charge which might be rendered
nugatory by the Barker proposals.
The whole thing is a mess and the comment made by
Baroness Hanham in the House of Lords that the process
had been done in a “hibbledy hobbledy way” really sums it
all up. The clauses that appeared were vague, the
Government’s intention being to deal with the details of
the proposals in secondary legislation. This was
unsatisfactory. Clearly it would have been better for the
details to have been considered at this stage before the Bill
is enacted.
The language used in the clauses is somewhat tortuous
and unnatural. Planning obligations as a concept itself is
somewhat strained and does not capture the essence of a
“planning gain” deal. The use of the word “contribute”
with the connotation of furnishing a common fund or
purpose is more appropriate for a payment of money or a
contribution in kind. It is not, however, a particularly
helpful term in relation to a finite requirement placed
upon a developer unrelated to any other contribution
requirement to make a development scheme acceptable.
The optional planning charge is referred to in the
legislation as “the prescribed means” and negotiated
planning contributions are referred to as “the relevant
requirements”. Whatever happened to plain English? The
intention of the legislature is to repeal sections 106, 106A
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and 106B, but at the same time to reinstate them as part of
the regulations. The question arises as to whether one
should keep section 106 as it is and to legislate merely for
the optional charge. On the one hand planning obligations
are being swept away only to be resurrected as planning
obligations as one form of planning contribution under the
proposed regulations. This approach has caused confusion
to users of the planning system.
Local authority expertise and resources
Already over-stretched, local authorities will not have
the expertise or internal resources to set up the optional
charge system and to formulate suggested planning charges
in their development plan documents in the absence of any
actual proposals on which to base their charges.
Commercial expertise may need to be bought it by local
authorities from the private sector which could be an
expensive exercise. It should be remembered that the local
authority will need to assess possible impacts from sites
within the development plan, whether or not there is a
development proposed. This could be a huge task and one
should bear in mind the time taken and money expended
by developers in preparing transport and environmental
impact assessments.
Local authorities will have to carry out major cost
analyses of the infrastructure needed arising from
developments likely to occur over the lifetime of a local
development plan document. Councils will need to
determine what proportion it is legitimate to seek to
recover through the planning charge.
A single charge for a local authority area would be
unacceptable because land values will vary too much across
a local authority area for that to be workable. Different
regimes/criteria will need to apply to different parts of a
local authority area with different economic/social profiles
and different land values. The authority will therefore have
the unenviable task of trying to work out how charges
should be set for different parts of the area.
In the House of Lords debate in Committee on 2
February 2004, Baroness Hanham asked whether the
Government would provide local planning authorities with
additional funding for the purposes of establishing the
tariff system. In response, Lord Rooker said that under the
new proposals, there may be savings as well as costs. He
acknowledged that it would be complicated to set up the
new system, but once it is bedded in, is likely to lead to less
time and resource input in individual applications if people
go down the charging tariff route. Once all the guidance is
done and once the regulations have been made, if it is a
formula he though that it would be a case of fairly
mechanical up-front calculations and there ought to be less
time spent on it.
Baroness Hanham thought that the system would be far
more complicated than someone licking a pen and adding
up a formula. Lord Rooker’s somewhat naïve glib
comments should be treated with some wariness. The
crisis in resources in local government should not be
underestimated. Many local authorities are working at the
limit of their resources. In order to cater for the new
system, it is inevitable that additional money, on top of the
planning delivery grant, will need to be pumped into
council planning departments. One way forward may be to
charge developers higher planning fees for planning
applications provided that that money is hypothecated to
the planning service within that authority.
Impact on development plan documents
The planning contribution system will be operated
through the local planning authorities development plan
documents or other presented document. There is a major
concern that examinations into drafts of those
development plan documents will become bogged down in
hearing valuation evidence. The examinations could
become more like Lands Tribunal hearings and the
Government’s aim to have up to date streamlined
development plan documents could be undermined. This
will again tax the resources of severely stretched local
authorities.
With the increased emphasis on community
involvement in the planning process, presumably every
interest group in a local authority area will be lobbying the
local authority for the planning gain that it wishes the
council to achieve for their area. This could exacerbate the
delays in the development plan process.
Will the optional planning charge be a tax on
development?
Clearly the tariff system promoted by the Government
in its December 2001 consultation paper was a form of
taxation as it was not related to meeting the cost of
mitigating the impact of a development. It was to be a flat
rate calculation applied with some flexibility to particular
forms of development. What about the optional charge
proposals? Are they a tax?
In the House of Commons on 8 December 2003, on the
first day of the Report Stage, Keith Hill said that concerns
had been raised that the optional charge proposals were a
tax on development. He said that that was untrue. He said
that the charge would have to relate to planning matters, as
the existing system of negotiated obligations does now.
Under the Government’s proposals, the level of the
planning contribution would be set out in advance and in
public which would allow it to be tested. The charge will
be applied only to the matters identified in the local
authority’s planning contributions policy. Further, the
developer can opt not to pay the charge at all, but to
negotiate over what level of contribution to offer.
In the House of Lords debate in Committee on 2
February 2004, Baroness Hanham was concerned to
prevent the planning contribution proposals being used as16
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a land tax or a development land tax. She said that as it
stands, the Bill seems capable of this. She was concerned
that such taxes on development might discourage useful
development.
Lord Rooker stated that the Government did not see the
value capture as a primary function of planning
contributions. He said that the main focus should be on
addressing the impact of a development with a degree of
flexibility to take account of its viability and of economic
circumstances. He added that the Government did not
want to see planning contributions used explicitly as a
means of raising extra revenue unconnected with the
development.
A number of commentators have been concerned that
there should be some connection between the
development proposed and the contribution contained in
the local planning authority’s planning contribution
documents, otherwise the tariff could be construed as
being a form of taxation. The Government acknowledged
in the ODPM Statement on 30 January 2004 that the
planning contribution offered, by whatever route, should
be related to the impact of development and be relevant,
proportionate and reasonable. This was an important
statement and was repeated by Lord Rooker in the House
of Lords debate in Committee on 2 February 2004.
The statement undermines the argument put forward by
various objectors that the proposals for the optional charge
is a form of taxation.
Necessity test
The Government has changed its mind about the
proposal set out in the November 2003 consultation paper
to abandon the Circular 1/97 necessity test to bring policy
in line with case law and thus to allow planning obligations
to be used to contribute to a wider range of impacts for
negotiated planning obligations. In its statement on 30
January 2004, the ODPM stated as follows:
“13 The Government has decided that, given the concern
which has been expressed about the scope of planning
obligations, it should consider further the proposal in its
consultation document to align its policy tests with the tests
applied by case law to planning obligations. The Government
believes that the policy tests set out in Circular 1/97, and in
particular the test of “necessity”, are not adequately adhered
to either by local authorities or by applicants. Case law
confirms that applicants may offer benefits not strictly
necessary for a development to proceed (which is a policy
requirement) but which are nevertheless connected to the
development. However, local authorities are constrained in
what they can request from developers because of the current
policy.
“14 The practice of applicants offering more than local
planning authorities think is necessary has caused confusion
in local authorities about what they can legitimately ask for.
As the consultation document indicated, the Government does
not consider this to be a satisfactory situation, and believes
that there may need to be some change to the way in which
the policy tests in Circular 1/97 are set out and enforced. The
Government will continue to consult with stakeholders on how
best to approach this issue”.
Agreement even for optional charge
It had been thought that the Government, in order to
justify its claim that the optional charge route would
provide speed and certainty, would have encouraged a
simple process whereby the developer, if it opted for the
charge route, would hand over its financial contribution,
calculated in accordance with the local development
framework to the local authority and in return would be
granted its planning permission. This would be a quick and
simple process.
The Government acknowledged however, in the debate
in the House of Commons on the first day of the Report
Stage on 8 December 2003, that there could be a standard
form of agreement set out in the proposed regulations.
Keith Hill made it clear that the Government envisaged
that the local authority and the developer would need to
come to some form of agreement, as they do now, on
whether they opt to make the contribution by the
prescribed means or the negotiated route. That agreement
will bind the developer to pay, and the local authority to
accept, the charge agreed at that point. The form of the
agreement could be decided between the local authority
and the developer or could take a standard form that the
Government may prescribe in regulations or issue as
guidance. In fact, clause 47(7) (b) provides that the
regulations may “make provision for setting out in writing
the terms of the planning contribution”.
If then, there is to be an agreement between the
developer and the Council, there is likely by definition to
be some form of negotiation. That being so, surely there
would then be an opportunity to include provisions
relating to the date of payment of the charge and whether
this will be phased and covenants by the local planning
authority as to how they are to spend the contribution; to
allow for the planning authority to give periodic reports as
to how the money has been spent and to allow for payback
of the sum or any unspent element thereof at an agreed
date. These matters could well be the subject of
negotiations and would bring certainty to the process. On
the other hand, it could slow down the process.
Residual negotiation – slowing down the process
There will be a possible need for residual negotiation
even where the developer elects for an optional charge.
Keith Hill acknowledged this in the House of Commons on
the first day of the Report Stage on 8 December 2003. He
said that where the developer opts to pay the contribution
by the prescribed means – the charge, a residual 17
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negotiation may be necessary to cover matters that could
never be covered by the charge. That is likely to be a
relatively common occurrence as there will be
development control issues that will need to be addressed
by a negotiated Agreement. This could have the effect of
slowing down the process.
Perversity
Any housing developer might be encouraged to develop
lower density, high value housing if the tariff were to be
based on the number of units to be provided rather than
on scheme value. A Labour controlled local authority may
set zero contributions in a Conservative controlled area,
and vice versa. The optional charge system could give local
authorities a perverse incentive to favour greenfield
developments in order to maximise their income from tariffs.
Enforcement
It is clear from the new clauses that a person deriving
title to land after a commitment to make a planning
contribution has been entered into will be bound by the
terms of the contribution. Under the existing section 106
arrangements, there is a specific provision whereby an
existing owner, once it sells its interest in the land, can
escape future liability. There is nothing specific in the new
clauses on this. The question arises as to whether the
position will be the same under the new arrangements. The
clauses seem to be silent on this.
Also on a question of enforcement, the Regulations may
provide for a condition to be attached to a planning
permission requiring payment of the planning contribution
prior to the commencement of the development. That is
contained at clause 47(6). In the House of Lords debate at
the Committee Stage on 5 February 2004, Baroness
Hanham referred to this clause and said she was concerned
that planning benefits are often provided over many years
as different stages are each in a development. She said that
front-loading the contributions would significantly increase
financing costs and risks and she suggested an amendment
to deal with this.
In response, Lord Rooker said that clearly there would
be circumstances in which a planning contribution could
not be made prior to the commencement of the
development. For example, the development might be
economically marginal and the developer might not have
funds with which to make a contribution until the
development is complete and he gets his return. Lord
Rooker pointed out that the local authority would be
entitled to vary the condition proposed. In the same way
that by default, conditions are attached planning
applications limiting their life to five years, local authorities
can vary this and local authorities could require planning
contributions to be made at times other than at the
commencement of the development.
This was an important point of clarification as it will be
essential on large scheme that are phased to allow for
planning contributions to be phased. It will not matter so
much in relation to negotiated contributions as the
agreement will set out any agreed phasing of payments.
Controls on how local planning authorities spend
money and provisions regarding return of money
There is a concern that when money is handed over
against a tariff to a local authority there is no knowing how
that money would be spent. How does one ensure that the
money is spent on relevant projects?
There will need to be proper controls on how a planning
charge is spent by the local planning authority, otherwise
the payment to the authority could be seen as being a
naked attempt to buy a planning permission. What if
money is not used for the intended purposes? How would
local authorities be made to comply?
In the House of Commons on 8 December 2003 on the
first day of the Report Stage, Keith Hill said that the
Government would anticipate a strenuous local response
which would control the situation. Having said that, he said
that the Government would have to give serious
consideration to the possibility of giving the Secretary of
State a reserve power in such circumstances. He said that
that was a matter for consideration and consultation after
which the Government may come forward with firmer
proposals.
As to the tracking of how money is spent by each local
authority, Keith Hill said that there should be proper
accountability in relation to the spending of income raised
by both a charge and the negotiated routes. He said that in
the consultation document the Government is proposing
that local authorities should set out in public and in
advance its policies on contributions for which it would
seek a contribution and the matters it spends income on.
He said that the Government proposed to take a power to
enable the Secretary of State to insist the receipts are spent
in the way envisaged in the public planning contributions
policy. He also said that the Government proposed a power
to require local planning authorities to make an annual
report on matters relating to planning contributions.
Further, he said that the Government proposed that the
Secretary of State should be able to prescribe the
procedure by which the charging policy was developed and
to take steps if he believed it was not being done
appropriately or at all.
In the House of Lords debate at Committee Stage on
5 February 2004, Baroness Hanham said that there was
concern to prevent a local authority holding on to money
received as a planning contribution indefinitely. She said
that there ought to be an amendment whereby the
Secretary of State could direct in regulations that after a
prescribed period that any money left over would be repaid
with interest if not spent on the required purposes.18
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Lord Rooker replied by stating that where the parties
negotiate, it is likely that the agreement will set out the
matters on which the contributions will be spent and
provide for repayment if they are not spent by the agreed
date. Where the applicant decides to pay the charge, the
matters on which the charge will be spent will be contained
in the local planning obligations policy. He said that the
whole point of the charge is that such matters are laid out
in the local planning obligations policy where everyone can
see what is required. In short, the provisions ensure that
the same redress is available to an applicant who has paid
the charge as it is to someone who has negotiated an
agreement.
All that the Government is doing is moving the
agreement on what the income will be spent on out of the
negotiated agreement and into the local planning
obligations policy prepared in advance. It is a plan-led
approach. The policy will have to be specific enough to give
the applicant certainty about what the charge will be spent
on otherwise the applicant would simply decide not to pay
the charge.
This is not very convincing. An agreement is surely the
proper way of controlling the matter with covenants
enforceable in the courts.
Will the planning charge remain optional?
Will not a negotiated agreement always result in a
reduced benefit for the local authority – otherwise why
would a developer opt for that route? Will a local authority
accept that?
Whilst the proposed planning charge is optional, there is
scepticism about whether it will remain so. The charge will
set the context for planning gain negotiations, particularly
so as it would have gone through the development plan
process with extensive consultations. The reality may be
that the charge set will be too high and will raise
expectations of what can be sought from rapacious
developers. If one took the negotiated route, it could well
be difficult to persuade a local authority to settle for less
than that set out in the charge. Negotiations therefore
could be somewhat difficult.
Impact on affordable housing
There have been major concerns expressed that the new
system could undermine the provision of affordable
housing.
It will be recalled that the Select Committee in their
report of 1 July 2002 were concerned that the
Government, needed to undertake substantially more work
to demonstrate that funding affordable housing by the
standardised tariff, rather than by the usual system of
Section 106 negotiation would clearly produce significantly
more affordable housing.
In the second reading debate on the Bill in the House of
Lords on 6 January 2004, Lord Best expressed concern
that the current system that obliged builders to allocate
land for affordable housing could be bypassed by house
builders opting to pay a contribution instead. He said that
this would mean that house builders would not have to
allocate any part of their developments for affordable
housing. Funds raised by such a tariff might not find their
way into affordable housing at all, not least because housing
associations or other providers of low cost homes might
find it impossible to buy the land they need elsewhere.
Further, even if other sites could be purchased, no doubt
in the least desirable locations, it would offend good
practice to build segregated ghettos of social housing for
poorer households rather than integrating these into mixed
income, mixed tenure developments with renters alongside
owners. He said that tariffs might sensibly replace
requirements to include affordable homes in some areas
where there was low demand for social, subsidised housing
and perhaps also at the very top end of the market where
one home for social housing could be replaced by several
for the same price elsewhere, but for most of the South of
England, and other housing hotspots, tariffs could be a
recipe for further reducing the numbers of new, affordable
homes unless the tariff system was tailored with great care.
Baroness Hanham was concerned as to the effect that
the proposals would have on affordable housing. She said
that there were flaws in section 106 but one of its chief
advantages is that the money can be used for the local
authority’s priorities associated with the development. She
said that there has probably been more affordable housing
built with section 106 money than with any money from
the Housing Corporation.
In the debate in the House of Lords on 2 February
2004, Lord Best explained that his own housing
association in York, the Joseph Rowntree Housing Trust,
had been engaged in a number of developments in recent
years. He said that the circumstances of each site were
unique. He said that one brown field site was an old refuse
tip leaking methane gas where they had to undertake
expensive decontamination work. One large green field site
had huge pylons and power lines that needed to be buried
underground. Special measures will be needed on another
site to protect against flooding. He said that we may find
the expensive consequences of discovering archaeological
remains under one site, while there may be requirements
to remove some protected species like the greater crested
newt on another site.
A development on one site could bring new viability to a
school with falling numbers, but another development will
have to be properly charged for the extra education costs
flowing from the arrival of more children where there are
no available school places.
In one part of any town, gentrification of a
neighbourhood that needs renewal would suggest a low 19
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tariff to attract development and in another part, perhaps
close by, a developer will be able to sell for high prices and
the local authority will have the chance to go for a higher
tariff. The scale of a development will make a major
difference, as will its density. There are also variations in
the subsidy arrangements for affordable housing which face
the developer and any partner housing association. Those
financial arrangements will also vary from site to site.
In one case, the Housing Corporation will be able to
offer social housing grant worth several hundred thousands
of pounds per house so that the housing association can
pay the developer something approaching the market price
for each affordable home. But in another case, no more
funds may be available as grants from the Housing
Corporation. If the development is to incorporate
affordable housing, the developer will need to put in some
serious money. In that case, it is not realistic to expect as
many affordable homes as could be supplied if plenty of
public money was available.
Lord Best made the point that each case is different and
that a negotiation, not a fixed charge or tariff, will be
necessary to achieve outcomes that are acceptable to all. At
York, the headline aspirational target of the council is for
50 per cent of affordable housing to meet its pressing
needs. But it has to accept lower figures of half, or less than
half, where the constraints on the developer make it
impossible to achieve such a high quota. He said that no
fixed tariff could cover all those circumstances, and if an
authority were to go down that route, he said that there
could be long delays in trying to calculate the level of
tariffs, as has been suggested. Once those levels are
announced, they are likely to lead to disagreements,
appeals, calls for judicial reviews or further delays as one
size may not fit more than one site.
It was also said by Lord Best that the Minister suggested
developers could simply reject the offer of the alternative
system of tariffs and choose to stay with the current section
106 negotiations thereby having nothing to do with the
new system. But the developer will worry that once the
local authority has set up its system of tariffs it will be
under some pressure to accept them. It will fear that once
the tariff system is set up, developers who reject will find
that all the current problems facing section 106
agreements are not likely to be cured. Current delays
include there being no skilled planners able to negotiate at
a sophisticated level, a lack of co-ordination between
relevant public bodies and the lack of a mediator or
arbitrator to help the process. The problems facing section
106 agreements may still be there and may be worse if the
local authority chooses a system of tariffs instead and
developers will feel under some pressure to accept them.
Lord Best suggested therefore that it was not likely that
we will be able to find the ways in which tariffs could be
applied to anything more than a single site at a time. If you
have a tariff which you apply to only one site at a time, you
do not have a tariff, you have a negotiation site by site. If
we are to have a negotiation, let us improve the section 106
agreements that do just that – negotiate site by site. There
is good mileage in that.
The concern was raised by Lord Best that in some local
authorities, the chance to take alternative more electorally
popular benefits from the developer could be seized upon.
He said that people living beside a planned development
will always have a shopping list of alternatives to affordable
housing which tariff homes could cover – local amenities
and facilities, improvements to the roads around the site,
environmental enhancement and so on. That could have a
severe impact on the amount of affordable housing being
provided.
Lord Best concluded that clause 46 should not be in the
Bill, partly because of the practical difficulties posed, but
partly because of the dangers it was feared it posed to the
provision of affordable housing. Under the current section
106 agreement, elaborate provisions are regularly
negotiated between developers and local planning
authorities to secure affordable housing provision usually
on site and increasingly in more than one location on site
to aid the concept of balanced communities and avoiding
creation of ghettos. Local planning authorities, through
section 106 agreements, control the construction and
deliver of the affordable housing and ensure that the
affordable housing units will be available in perpetuity as
affordable housing, usually through the medium of a
registered social landlord. Nomination rights are often
negotiated and service charges capped with the provisions
being contained within the section 106 agreement.
If a developer opts for the charge route in relation to a
particular scheme, and even if the developer offers
affordable housing in kind in accordance with the local
authority’s policies, how will the local planning authority
be able to secure, as they do now, the actual delivery of the
housing on site and future controls over that affordable
housing? Conceivably, the authority could impose a
planning condition relating to the delivery of that
affordable housing, but a condition could not achieve the
same sophisticated controls with an element of mutuality
as exists under the present section 106 system. Lord Best’s
concerns regarding the impact of the optional charge on
the provision of affordable housing are real ones.
16. HOW WILL PLANNING
CONTRIBUTIONS WORK?
The essential question posed in this paper is “How will
planning contributions work?”.
To the extent that developers opt for planning
contributions to be dealt with as they are now, by way of
negotiated agreements, then there is every reason to think
that they will work well – business as usual. The only
potential cloud on the horizon may be how wide the
necessity test is drawn in policy terms in the replacement20
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Circular for Circular 1/97. It may be drawn wider than the
existing necessity tests as the Government seeks to ensure
that developers contribute to sustainable development
which might be more than purely dealing with the impact
of a development.
Will local planning authorities be reasonable if a
developer opts for the negotiated route? The developer will
no doubt have seen an advantage in pursuing the negotiated
route, the obvious point being that he sees that as being
less expensive than paying the tariff. The local authority
may sense that and may try and make life difficult for the
developer in the negotiation. That could mean that the
developer has to take the matter to appeal with the expense
and delay that that would entail. That surely cannot be
satisfactory.
To the extent that developers pursue the optional charge
route, it is anybody’s guess how the system will work. With
only skeleton provisions being available in the Bill and
without benefit of a sight of the proposed draft regulations
or the Government’s proposed draft Circular, it is hard to
know how the optional charges will operate. The
Government has at least now agreed to set up pilot
schemes to test out the optional charge and thankfully has
taken on board advisers in the form of the task force to
think through the tariff proposals and how they might work
in practice. Judgment will therefore have to be reserved on
the workability of the optional charge until an assessment
can be made as to how any pilot scheme has worked and to
see whether there are any practical problems and until the
views of the task force have been received and analysed.
The Government should also not lose sight of the local
authority resource issue which could have an impact on the
workability of optional charges and the slowing effect they
could have on adoption of development plan documents.
If the Government were to accept Kate Barker’s
proposed planning gain supplement, then that would
undoubtedly spell the demise of the optional planning
charge, as the systems would be in conflict with each other.
It may be therefore that the optional charge will be a short-
lived measure, even assuming it ever gets off the ground.
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